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Making Room for Peoples at the
United Nations: Thoughts Provoked
by Indigenous Claims to
Self-Determination
The things which God Himself has made will pass away, how much
sooner that which Romulus founded.
St. Augustine
l
But the international system itself is nothing other than a structure of
ideas; and it has been made nowhere else than in the human mind. The
international order forms the minds of those who make the international





It has been more than twenty years since I last saw Ithaca, New York.
That was in the summer of 1970, when I arrived from New Haven to
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David Trubek and Marc Galanter, for the support and encouragement which made
this and other writings possible. She also warmly thanks Ruth Buchanan for being a
god-sister, intellectual and emotional, in the writing project of which this is a part;
and Stephen T. Boggs, friend and fellow academic-activist, without whom she would
"per son nord." Copyright © owned by author. All rights reserved.
1. Quoted in NORMAN H. BAYNES, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE'S "DE
CIVrrATE DEI" 17 (1968). For a comparison of the mythological account of Romu-
lus's violent founding of Rome with the U.S. Supreme Court's mythological account
of the violent founding of the United States, see MILNER S. BALL, CONSTITUTION,
COURT, INDIAN TRIBES (1987).
2. PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD xv-xvi (1990).
3. A number of stepping stones led to this paper: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary
Symposium of the Cornell International Law Journal, its staff's choice of a timely theme
in whose general area I was working, "The Nations Within," and an invitation to
participate with a reflective (i.e., few footnotes) essay on the subject, which would not
take too much time away from a more orthodox (i.e., many footnotes) article I was
preparing on the claims of indigenous peoples to self-determination. I am deeply
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study Indonesian under a joint arrangement of the Cornell and Yale
Southeast Asian programs. Relatively few Southeast Asians studied or
lived in the United States then, and the Vietnam War was still raging.
These factors, together with the natural gregariousness of our youth,
made those of us at Cornell who had come from the Philippines, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia cling
together in an unnamed but unmistakable community defined by rice,
fish-sauce, ghost stories, and anti-imperialism. While few of us ever
dared walk past the cemetery on Stewart Avenue alone at night, or even
at twilight, many of us imagined that one day, U.S. degree in hand and
middle-class parents properly placated, we would develop the courage
necessary to join the revolutionary movements then energizing our
respective countries. So indulgent were we of our socialist fantasies that
one evening, only half in jest, we debated which of our countries should
volunteer to retain capitalism so that there would remain, in our shared
region, at least one place to which struggle-weary revolutionaries could
repair for an occasional, good old-fashioned, capitalist fling. The per-
son who volunteered his country for that task that night was the most
capitalistically decadent and personally charming member of our group.
As it turned out, he was also the only one of us to join a resistance move-
ment upon returning home. I saw him a year ago; he was still delightful,
still in the resistance.
I tell this story to mark my place in Cornell's lineage and simultane-
ously to place Cornell in a lineage that may be unknown to its current
students. The story is also told to evoke the feeling of worlds within
worlds and to suggest a sense of our century's crossing trajectories of
momentary plans and enduring visions, all of which international law
must now address. As I see it, international society today consists of,
among other actors, 4 states that tend to pursue focused political plans,
and ethnic groups or peoples who tend to entertain comprehensive visions
of their identities and destinies. 5 The developments discussed in this
grateful to the students on the Journal for their invitation, and admire their decision
to stimulate interest in "The Nations Within" as a topic in international law. The
paper presented here largely retains the exploratory spirit in which it was given at the
Symposium.
4. To name the most obvious others: international organizations such as the
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, transnational corporations
(TNCs) such as Dole and Phillip, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such
as Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund. Philip Allott, in his recent
work, similarly casts the net of international society widely: "(1) Society is the collec-
tive self-creating of human beings. (2) International society is the society of the
whole human race and the society ofall societies. (3) Law is the continuing structure-
system of human socializing. (4) International law is the law of international soci-
ety." ALLO'rr, supra note 2, at 3. He goes on to refute specifically the proposition
that international society is nothing more than the society of nation-states. See id. at
4.
5. I use the word "tend" advisedly for, as the phenomenon of modern national-
ism shows, states and peoples today, far from functioning apart, engage in intense
mutual transubstantiation as each attempts to aggregate to itself that which most
empowers the other: police coercion in the case of states, and cultural persuasion in
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symposium, in which peoples challenge states, may thus be represented
as a confrontation between plan and vision or, were it only so under-
stood, a questioning of plan by vision.6
In that confrontation, international law has traditionally privileged
states and, by extension, their focused political goals. This privileging
of states dates back to the 1648, Peace of Westphalia, which, it is gener-
ally agreed, formally established the interstate system in Europe.
7
Today, three centuries later, the Westphalian-derived unidimensionality
of international law encounters tremendous pressure, and approaches
rupture, as other units in international society, among which ethnic
groups may be the most potent, assert their presence and their visions. 8
Consequently, if international law is to continue to regulate interna-
the case of ethnic groups or peoples. The conceptual opposition I have set up here
between states' plans and peoples' visions therefore highlights two different kinds of
activities in international society, rather than two segregated categories of actors. I
use the term "peoples" to mean an ethnic group or cultural community throughout
this paper. Indigenous peoples, in turn, are ethnic groups who, the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations suggests, are immemorially associated
with a territory in which they wish to maintain a way of life that is different from the
dominant culture of the surrounding state. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE
FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6-7 (2d ed. 1987).
6. If the relationship between ethnic groups and states generates political diffi-
culty in international society, its complexity in academia generates literature, some of
which is quite fascinating. Two recent surveys of the literature are: RobertJ. Foster,
Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 235
(199 1); and B. F. Williams, A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic
Terrain, 18 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 401 (1989). Foundational works in the area
include: BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); PARTHA CHATrERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND
THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE (1986); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS
AND NATIONALISM (1983); Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation? (translated from the classic
1882 French original Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?), in NATION AND NARRATION 8 (Homi K.
Bhabha ed., 1990); A. D. SMrIH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986); CRAWFORD
YOUNG, THE POLrrICs OF CULTURAL PLURALISM (1976).
7. "The origin of the international community in its present structure and con-
figuration is usually traced back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) .... " ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 34 (1986). Noting that ordered
intercommunity relations in Europe and the Middle East existed long before 1648,
Cassese distinguishes such relations from those that Westphalia legitimized on two
counts: the former did not involve centralized bureaucratic states, which had not yet
emerged; and they remained, at least in Europe, formally subject to the ordering
authority of both the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. Westphalia, for the first
time, gave states both formal freedom from the Pope and defacto freedom from the
Emperor. In other words, Westphalia invented sovereign and independent states.
Id. at 34-38.
8. A list of today's most serious, ethnically charged challenges to states would
include those in Canada, the Amazon region of South America, Eastern Europe, the
former USSR, the Middle East, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, East Timor, and West
Papua. The tension and atrocities that ethnic-related conflicts unleash in these places
certainly call into question my positive use of the term "vision" to describe the goals
of ethnic groups. I hope to deal more adequately with this seeming contradiction in a
later work, and I assert here only that the ugly urgencies of history that have been
largely generated by the destructive military and economic policies of the world's
powerful states in the last five decades may have infected and distorted, but cannot
negate, the memory and prescience encoded in the cultures of ethnic groups often
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tional society, it may have to be reconceived, and its institutions restruc-
tured, so as to include peoples as well as states as its rightful subjects,
entitled to engage in the mutual if differential construction, interpretation,
and implementation of its norms.9 This, in any event, is the conclusion I
have come to after observing the decade-old campaign of indigenous
peoples to have their right to self-determination recognized at the
United Nations.
I shall support my conclusion in a two-step argument. First, I will
discuss certain conceptual and institutional features of the present inter-
national legal system that I believe unduly, and detrimentally, elevate
states and suppress peoples. Second, I will suggest revisions to these
features that, in my view, would support a more productive tension
between states and peoples, or plans and visions, than international law
currently allows. Again, both my critique and my proposals spring from
my relative familiarity with the indigenous peoples' campaign at the
United Nations for the recognition of their self-determination.10 Had I
followed another campaign-for the protection of minorities, women,
children, transnational labor, or the environment, for example-I might
have developed yet another perspective on the changes needed in the
concepts, practice, and institutions of international law. Each of the
campaigns I have listed, therefore, merits careful attention as their
issues are debated in the various arenas where international law is now
in fact being proposed, negotiated, and made." Only by piecing
together the stories told in these places will we discover where it is in
far older than such states. To put it succinctly, cultures create Goethes; but it takes a
culture and a state to create Hitlers.
9. For a range of views on whether peoples, as distinguished from states and
individuals, detain international rights and, additionally, are, or should be, subjects
of international law, see THE RiGrrs OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988). A simi-
lar discussion that focuses exclusively on indigenous peoples is found in Are Indige-
nous Peoples Entitled to International Juridical Personality?, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 189
(1985) (panel discussion); and Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging
Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INrT'L L. 369 (1986).
10. I began to study the impact of Western law on indigenous Hawaiian land ten-
ure in 1983 and to collaborate with indigenous Hawaiian activists soon thereafter.
The latter were then reaching the conclusion that the recovery of their lands required
the reassertion of their sovereignty and self-determination. Stimulated, I began the
legal investigation of these subjects and went on to participate in the 1989 Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO) session during which ILO Convention 169 Con-
cerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was finalized, as
well as the 1991 session of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations during which work on a Declaration of Indigenous Rights continued.
11. The formal sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice are: conventions, custom, general principles of law
and, secondarily, the teachings of jurists. Statute of the International Court ofJus-
tice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945), T.S. No. 993. Informally, however, law
develops out of the raw material of social contest and conflict. Increasingly, it is the
committees and specialized agencies of the United Nations, rather than its General
Assembly, Security Council, or International Court of Justice, that receive and pro-
cess this raw material. To the extent that non-state parties participate in that
processing, as they more and more do, they are helping make law.
PVol. 25
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international society that blockages and breakthroughs occur and where,
therefore, international law fails and where it still serves.
I. The Indigenous Campaign for Self-determination
In 1982, in response to significant lobbying efforts mounted by indige-
nous peoples and their supporters in nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), the U.N. Economic and Social Council created a Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group), which it placed
under its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities. 12 The Sub-Commission, in turn, answers to the
Commission on Human Rights, which itself answers to the Council. Five
legal experts from around the world make up the Working Group.'
3
They are charged, first, with gathering information on the situation of
indigenous peoples around the world and, second, with enunciating a
set of standards, or Declaration of Indigenous Rights, that could guide
and ameliorate the relations of indigenous peoples with their surround-
ing states. Since its inception, the Working Group has met almost every
summer in Geneva to receive the views of indigenous peoples, states,
and NGOs on the twin subjects of "what is" and "what should be."' 4
Indigenous peoples' conception of "what should be" is far from
monolithic and further subdivides into immediate, intermediate, and
long-term goals. Where a group's survival is imminently threatened, as
in the Amazonian rainforest, indigenous peoples have urgently
requested, and on occasion obtained, prompt and extraordinary Work-
ing Group intervention. In general, however, the Working Group pre-
fers to direct its energies to the drafting of a Declaration of Indigenous
Rights that could advance the intermediate indigenous goal of holding
states accountable to international standards of respect and protection
12. A lawyer and member of the Potawatomi Tribe in the United States who has
worked continuously on indigenous issues at the U.N. since those early lobbying days
is Robert T. Coulter, Director of the Indian Law Resource Center. At the request of
UNESCO, he has drafted an informal memoir of those days. See Robert T. Coulter,
Recollections of the Early Years of Indian Involvement in the International Commu-
nity, 1974-83 (on file with author).
13. The five experts on the Working Group in the summer of 1991 were: Erica-
Irene Daes (chair, Greece), Ribot Hatano (Japan), Miguel Alfonso Martinez (Cuba),
Christy Mbone (Nigeria), Danilo Turk (Yugoslavia). UNITED NATIONS, DISCRIMINA-
TION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS ON ITS NINTH SESSION at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40 [herein-
after DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES].
14. The Working Group, allocated insufficient funds, did not hold an annual ses-
sion in the summer of 1986. The attendance of indigenous peoples at sessions that
have been held varies by region. For diverse reasons associated with the genesis of
the Working Group (in which the indigenous peoples of the Americas played a signif-
icant role), the accessibility of Geneva, the availability of funding, and degrees of
political freedom in the respective states in which indigenous peoples live, those peo-
ples from the Americas and northern Europe are most consistently represented in
Geneva, followed by groups from the Pacific, Asia, and, to a much lesser extent, the
former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East.
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for indigenous peoples, lands, resources, and cultures. 15 Finally, the
Working Group has moved slowest on the long-term foundational ques-
tion of self-determination. This, notwithstanding that self-determina-
tion is "the most strident and persistently declared demand voiced
before the Working Group."' 16
The classic U.N. statement on the right to self-determination reads:
"All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development."' 17 As phrased, the right to
self-determination amounts to a right to make decisions. The U.N. has
specified that these decisions can legitimately produce a range of accept-
able outcomes, from sovereign independence through free association
with an independent state to incorporation with it. 18 Furthermore, U.N.
documents assert, the status of free association is reversible.' 9
Indigenous participants at ILO and Working Group sessions have
repeatedly asserted that their peoples intend to exercise the right to self-
determination to effect a free association with surrounding states rather
than independence. 20 The association they envision, however, must
include both a mutually satisfactory sharing of jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition that the indigenous share of that jurisdiction rests upon an
inherent right, and not a revocable grant. These two demands,
unadorned as they are, fundamentally challenge the principles of state
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction that modern states have come to
rely on. Their governments, consequently, vigorously resist the indige-
nous claim for self-determination that has launched this challenge. Pre-
ferring to ignore the call for free association, and the novel
accommodations it requires, these governments instead raise the easy
15. The seven parts of the 1991 draft Declaration address these topics: self-
determination; culture; lands and resources; institutions; relations with surrounding
states; conflict-resolution; and the Declaration as a statement of minimum standards.
16. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE LJ. 660,
693.
17. This paragraph first appeared in 1960 in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter Declaration]. It
reappeared as Articles 1 of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967).
18. G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., annex, principle VI (1990).
19. Id. principle VII.
20. A 1988 statement of the National Coalition of Aboriginal Organizations of
Australia to the ILO reads in part: "Secondly, we define our rights in terms of self-
determination. We are not looking to dismember your States and you know it."
National Coalition of Aboriginal Organizations of Australia, Statement During the
ILO Conference 1988 (on file with author). The Statement of the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference on Review of Developments (uly 29, 1991) (submitted to the Working
Group; on file with author) echoes this point, as do multiple statements of other
indigenous peoples.
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specter of secession, which they claim self-determination inevitably
entails.
States and nations, lest we forget, have long endured the ebb and
flow of their boundaries. In this respect, the modern doctrine of the
territorial integrity of states represents but a vainglorious attempt to
interdict history. In this century alone, several cumbersome empires
crumbled under the weight of war in Central Europe and the Third
World. Their constituent ethnic parts, in the meanwhile, survived. The
spectacle of the making and unmaking of states continues today as both
political fusion and fission unfold in Western Europe, the former
Germanys, the Baltics, and the late USSR. These cataclysmic changes,
furthermore, take place against a backdrop of remarkable interstate tol-
erance and calm which, however, turns into positive skittishness when
confronted by indigenous claims to self-determination that, by compari-
son, generally would not, and probably could not, alter borders. 2 1
States are not alone in assuming that the right to self-determination
leads to a single predetermined end: secession.22 The Working Group
generally joins them in this assumption, which on its face is not far-
fetched since Third World peoples after World War II uniformly exer-
cised their right to self-determination to achieve independence rather
than association or incorporation with former colonial states. Neverthe-
less, the present extension of this assumption to a different issue, in a
different world, illustrates the lag that has developed between legal the-
ory or culture on the one hand (i.e., the settled expectation that self-
determination is used to effect independence) and practice or history on
the other (i.e., the actual indigenous preference for a self-determination
that leads to equitable association). Or, to put it somewhat post-mod-
ernly, the persistence of the assumption demonstrates how the
modernistically totalizing approach that "a rose is a rose is a rose" com-
pels us to find a thorn even when the alchemical circumstances of the
late, and interdependent, twentieth century have already transformed
the defiant rose into an accommodating, if enigmatic, violet.
21. The "could not" follows from the relative material powerlessness of indige-
nous communities, many of which, in addition, are extremely small. For example, the
Yaqui in Bolivia now number little more than 130 persons. Sandy Tolan & Nancy
Postero, Accidents of History, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 42.
22. For a brief but very thoughtful review of the issues packed in the concept of
secession, see Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 89, 802 (1980). For specific
views on when secession is or is not legitimate, see Ved Nanda, Self-Determination
Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257
(1981); W. Michael Reisman, Somali Self-Determination in the Horn, in NATIONALISM AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 151 (I. M. Lewis ed., 1983); Eisuke
Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separa-
tion, 16 VA.J. INT'L L. 779 (1976); LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF
SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territo-
rial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE
MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC
(1991).
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 25
To prevent misunderstanding, let me assert unambiguously that
indigenous peoples are asserting some kind of distance from their sur-
rounding states. The following U.N. working definition of indigenous
peoples recognizes as much:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, hav-
ing a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
have developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their contin-
ued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns,
social institutions and legal systems.
[a]n indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous
populations through self-identification as indigenous . . . and is recog-
nized and accepted by these populations as one of its members .... 23
Some 250 million people, inhabiting all major regions of the globe, cur-
rently fit this description, which affirms a distancing of indigenous peo-
ples from their surrounding states on three counts: territory,
institutions, and subjective identification. 24
But the point I raise is this: even here, where territoriality is
claimed (let alone in other ethnic/state conflicts, where territoriality is
not), need self-determination trigger secession? The small size of many
indigenous groups alone renders secession improbable. 25 Secondly, as
previously noted, representatives of indigenous peoples, even as they
assert distance, regularly represent to the United Nations that they do
not seek secession. Instead, what is being proposed here, and I suspect
in other state/ethnic conflicts as well, are visions of simultaneously con-
nected and distanced relationships between peoples and their surround-
ing states. Whether states have the material and ideological flexibility to
respond to these visions or not remains to be seen. If they do, then
these visions can become a matter for the two parties most concerned
(an indigenous people and its surrounding state) to negotiate, prefera-
bly under the protection of the U.N., which can best assure that both
equity and order will be respected in the process of change. The ques-
tion that would then arise for international law in this scenario is this:
Can peoples' multiple and evolving visions of connection to, and dis-
tance from, their surrounding states be juridically and institutionally
accommodated? Given the pronounced indeterminacy of international
law, I would suggest that the answer depends as much on will as on
23. 5 JosE MARTINEZ COBo, U.N. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DIsCRIMI-
NATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 379-81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7,
U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987).
24. JULIAN BURGER, THE GAIA ATLAS OF FIRST PEOPLES 12 (1990).
25. See supra note 21.
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existing legal resources. 2 6 But one must start with the resources: old,
new, conceptual, and institutional.
II. Existing Concepts
While states oppose indigenous claims to self-determination on ulti-
mately economic and political grounds, they justify and perhaps even
conceive of this opposition in terms of international legal concepts
whose meanings have been not so much declared as historically filled in.
The key concepts at issue here are sovereignty, statehood, peoples, and
self-determination. A quick and highly interpretive review of the geneal-
ogy of these concepts offers some explanation for the present impasse
between states and indigenous peoples.
A. The Religious Lineage
My point of departure is the Christian West, from whose cultural and
political milieu present international law springs. Christendom's foun-
dational document, the New Testament, tells us that an agent provocateur
once asked Jesus what the Jews should do: serve Rome, or the Jewish
theocracy? Like a good lawyer, Jesus replied: "Give to Caesar what is
Caesar's, and to God what is God's."'2 7 The point, confirmed in St.
Augustine's City of God, is that at its origin the Christian West recognized
that two different lineages simultaneously fixed the human position: the
secular and the religious.28 Although the interests of these two lineages
intertwined, they remained conceptually distinct. They shared personal
and territorial jurisdiction, so to speak, but bifurcated on subject-matter
jurisdiction, as this 494 A.D. letter from Pope Gelasius I to Emperor
Anastasius I shows: "For if the bishops themselves.., obey your laws so
far as the sphere of public order is concerned lest they seem to obstruct
your decrees in mundane matters, with what zeal, I ask you, ought you
to obey those who have been charged with administering the sacred
ceremonies?" 29
The religious lineage marked all humans as the children of God,
entitled to an irreducible dignity that secular power was bound to
26. The indeterminacy of U.S. municipal law identified by the Realist School is no
longer seriously questioned. But the indeterminacy of international law is even more
pronounced, as this question commonly posed in one form or another in interna-
tional law textbooks makes clear: "Is international law really law?" MICHAEL
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1984).
27. Luke 20:20-26.
28. Here the two civitates - the civitas of God and the civitas of the Devil - are
contrasted. The latter seeks to serve the world, the former to serve Christ:
one desires to rule in this world, the other to flee from this world; one slays,
the other is slain; one labors for damnation, the other for salvation. It is thus
from the schismatic that Augustine would seem to have borrowed the great
contrast on which his work is founded.
BAYNES, supra note I, at 5-6.
29. Quoted in ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT 16 (1990).
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respect. Protecting this dignity, the Dominican Friar Antonio de
Montesinos railed against the Spaniards for their barbarous treatment of
early sixteenth century Hispaniola natives: "Are these not men? Have
they not rational souls? Are you not bound to love them as you love
yourselves?" 30 Another Spaniard, the jurist Franciscus de Vitoria, sys-
tematically elaborated on the rights of Indians. According to Vitoria,
the natives of the New World were entitled not only to love but also to
their own institutions. This, he reasoned, was not only because of their
divine descent, but because of the inherent rationality and equal free-
dom accorded all men under the natural law that God has ordained.3 1
Robert A. Williams finds that Vitoria, generally innovative for his time,
was planning, in that argument, the seeds of legal modernity, or secular
universalism: "This singular innovation on Victoria's part initiated the
process by which the European state system's legal discourse was ulti-
mately liberated from its stultifying, expressly theocentric, medievalized
moorings and was adapted to the rationalizing demands of Renaissance
Europe's secularized will to empire."'3 2 The rationalizing demands of
Empire in time collapsed the structural tension that had been main-
tained through medieval times between the secular and the religious.
The collapse was signalled by the Thirty Years' War, which bitterly
embroiled Pope, emperor, and princes; it was consummated in the 1648,
Peace of Westphalia, which ended that struggle.33 Though the Peace of
Westphalia is usually depicted as a landmark in the secularization of
Europe, Antonio Cassese underlines the ongoing role of religion after
1648, no longer as oppositional force, of course, but as formative
ideology.
All the States above-mentioned had a common religious matrix: they were
Christian .... Another strong unifying factor was the pattern of internal
economic and political development. All Western States were the out-
growth of capitalism and its matching phenomenon in the political field:
absolutism (followed in subsequent years by parliamentary democracy). 34
While the Peace of Westphalia extricated the Pope and the Holy
Roman Emperor from the affairs of states then, it did not extricate
Christianity itself, which the new states could now use as their
unmediated cultural tools in their quests for absolutism. Thus, even
though the peoples governed by the European dynasties of the 17th
Century remained the theoretical kindred of God, they became once-
removed from Him and from the downward-flowing source of their dig-
nity by the new device of the unopposed and sovereign state. Of the two
lineages that fixed the human condition in early Christendom then, only
one, the secular, remained in charge of men's earthly lives. The other,
30. Quoted in id. at 86.
31. Id. at 93-108.
32. Id. at 96-97.
33. See supra note 7.
34. CASSESE, supra note 7, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
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the religious, was evicted from its secular premises, but not before being
purloined of its magic.
B. The Secular Lineage
The French Revolution of 1789 secularized this magic and reversed the
direction of legitimacy.3 5 Untrammelled either by the grace of God or
the pleasure of the King, the peoples of France now became sovereign in
their own right and by their own original consent empowered a republi-
can government to act on their behalf. I say peoples because, on the
occasion of the creation of the modern French state, a French people
did not yet exist, as only Bretons, Basques, Gascons, Auvergnats, etc.,
occupied France.3 6 To the extent that the ethnic French now exist, as
they clearly do, it is as the later distillate of the common post-revolution-
ary experiences of their heterogenous forebears who, by their shared
deeds, bit by bit transformed the culturally flat state of the 18th century
into a symbolically plausible nation of the 20th.
While the French state searched for and successfully fashioned a
people, the story of German unification is generally told as one of a peo-
ple looking for a state. A recent study rejecting this truism asserts that it
was the Prussian government, and not the German people, that called
forth the German state.3 7 Indeed, the peoples who inhabited the former
lands of the 300 sovereign states that constituted the Holy Roman
Empire of the German Nation apparently strongly opposed Bismarck's
project of unification. The rebuke the Austrian poet Franz Grillparzer
administered to the Bismarck government is thought to reflect their sen-
timent: "You claim that you have founded a Reich ... but all you have
done is to destroy a Volk." 3 8
However different or controversial in genesis, the French and Ger-
man entities eventually converged on the common goal of uniting a sin-
gle cultural people with a single sovereign state. Once again, then, there
was merger: of the cultural and the political dimensions this time. This
35. Ernest Gellner suggests that the magic, while secularized, remained relatively
unavailable to states organized as constitutional monarchies. West European
monarchs "by symbolizing the continuity of the state or the nation... prevent elec-
tive leaders, who are responsible for decision and policies, from acquiring too much
magic. It is a way of helping ensure that real power is not sacred." ERNEST GELLNER,
CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND POLITICS 163 (1987).
36. A work rich in data and theory on this subject is EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS
INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL FRANCE 1870-1914 (1976). While
Weber concentrates on the years 1870-1914, one-third of his book relates "The Way
Things Were," providing pre-revolutionary data. Even a century after the Revolu-
tion, however, Weber notes that France was still not quite a nation. "In 1863,
according to official figures, 8381 of France's 37,510 communes spoke no French:
about a quarter of the country's population." Id. at 67. "The Third Republic found a
France in which French was a foreign language for half the citizens." Id. at 70. "It is
clear that France around 1870 did not conform to Mauss' model of a nation. It was
neither morally nor materially integrated; what unity it had was less cultural than
administrative." Id. at 485.
37. SeeJAMESJ. SHEEHAN, GERMAN HISTORY 1770-1866, 853-69 (1991).
38. Quoted in id. at 911.
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German/French invention, denominated the nation-state, came not only
to dominate Europe but was also the only European political model of
ethnic/state relations exported to Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Ameri-
cas during the colonial period.3 9 Those whom the model convinced in
these overseas territories, i.e., the elite, consequently developed the
view that the non-state institutions that traditionally played a political
role in their communities-such as the family, the ethnic group, the
church, the mosque, and the village-represented but so many inciden-
tal, backward, and even illegitimate legacies that needed to be curtailed,
if not discarded, on the road to modernity.
40
C. The Early Twentieth Century
Ironically, the political models that were not exported from Europe
might have better suited the ethnically complex circumstances of the
colonies. I think, for example, of Switzerland, where many ethnic
groups continue to maintain a shared state; or even of the Ottoman,
Austro-Hungarian and Czarist Empires, which came closer in function to
the system of tributary relationships that criss-crossed Southeast Asia
than the nation-state ever could.4 1 The second irony is that the nation-
state concept straight-jacketed even Europe, and may have hastened the
outbreak of the First World War, which may have been the first war
fought over nation-stateness as such: its presence, as well as its absence.
The League of Nations, certainly, gave itself the ambitious task after
the war of rearranging the peoples and boundaries of Europe in such a
way as to obtain a maximum fit between ethnicity and statehood. It frag-
mented the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires into their ethnic
parts as much as possible and, where ethnically or politically unfeasible,
it created autonomous regimes for peoples enclosed within heterogene-
ous states. 42 Both actions were justified on the principle of the self-
determination of peoples, which Lenin had enunciated, and which
Woodrow Wilson attempted to appropriate, if only eventually to redi-
rect and constrict at the urging of Churchill, who rightly understood the
concept's power to dismantle the British Empire.43 The League secured
several autonomous regimes for ethnic minorities by first negotiating,
and later supervising, minority treaties with target states. Significantly,
the peoples protected by these treaties played no formal role in either
39. See ANDERSON, supra note 6; CHATrERJEE, supra note 6; GELLNER, supra note 6;
and YOUNG, supra note 6.
40. Id.
41. The many intricate, layered, overlapping, and interchangeable patterns of
cultural identity, political control, and economic interaction that developed in South-
east Asia are described in: JOHN K. FAIRBANK, THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER (1968);
KENNETH R. HALL, MARITIME TRADE AND STATE DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY SOUTHEAST
ASIA (1985); EDMUND R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1964); 0.
W. WOLTERS, EARLY INDONESIAN COMMERCE (1967).
42. Richard B. Bilder, Can Minorities Treaties Work?, 20 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 71 (1990); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 38-54 (1991).
43. CASSESE, supra note 7, at 131-32.
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their construction or implementation. 44
If Westphalia invented the modem state, and the French Revolu-
tion idealized its cultural unity, then the League invented the foil for the
ideal: League wardship. Whether League wardship could have deliv-
ered order and justice to states and ethnic minorities will never be con-
clusively known, for the rise of fascism in Europe prematurely thwarted
the experiment. A much older wardship system, however, i.e., U.S. fed-
eral Indian policy, has been tested, and proven legally untenable, as well
as humanly unjustifiable in its impact on Native Americans.4 5 The major
fault policy, as in the League system, in my opinion, is that ultimate deci-
sion-making powers affecting indigenous and minority peoples in the
two circumstances rested exclusively with the surrounding state, or the
League, and not the peoples themselves.
D. The Late Twentieth Century
The League, under pressure from the European colonial powers, wholly
side-stepped the issue of the self-determination of non-European peo-
ples after World War 1.46 By the close of World War II, however, the
Churchillian position on this question became wholly untenable. The
War had loosened Western Europe's hold over its colonies, Third
World nationalism was on the rise, and the victorious Soviet Union
squarely supported decolonization. Recolonization became unthinkable
to the Third World/Socialist majority voting block that coalesced at the
United Nations after the War.
It was in this context that the U.N. included, in Article 1 of its 1945
Charter, the following reference to the principle of self-determination:
[the Purposes of the United Nations are:] ...
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.
Fifteen years later, the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ("Declaration") called the
principle a right, and defined it. The definition was reproduced in 1966
in the two U.N. human rights Covenants.4 7 Yet, neither the Charter, the
Declaration, the Covenants, nor any other international law instrument
44. Bilder, supra note 42.
45. For the legal impact, see BALL, supra note 1, and Curtis G. Berkey, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Assault on Indian Sovereignty, 2 WrrHour PREJUDICE 27-40 (1990).
A more optimistic view is expressed in CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,
TIME, AND THE LAw (1987).
46. Already at Versailles, where the Treaty that formally ended World War I was
signed, the colonized received their rebuff. Ho Chi Minh, for one, had gone there on
his own initiative to present his eight-point program, based on President Woodrow
Wilson's 14-point program, for a degree of self-government for Vietnam. Wilson
refused to see him. JEAN LACOUTURE, Ho CHI MINH 24 (1968). Ho Chi Minh then
went on to Moscow where he was not only received, but celebrated, and thereafter
consistently supported by the Comintern. Id.
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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defines the "peoples" who hold this right. As a result, the meanings of
both "self-determination" and "peoples" remain contentious, and fluc-
tuate with U.N. practice.
That practice was powerfully marked by three dominant concerns of
the Third World/Socialist alliance of the post-war decades: termination
of European rule in Asia, Africa, and Oceania; vigilance against its reap-
pearance in a new form; and preservation of the territorial shells that
the Europeans had left behind. The 1960 Declaration and its subse-
quent elaboration in various General Assembly resolutions record these
concerns. For example, the 1960 Declaration begins: "The subjection
of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace
and cooperation." 48 Resolution 1541, passed the following day, speci-
fied that the term "colonial country" in the Declaration meant a non-
self-governing territory which (note the alchemy) in turn referred to an
entity geographically and ethnically separate from the administering
state. The Resolution thus elliptically reproduced what speeches made
in the General Assembly stated more directly: that only peoples sepa-
rated by "blue-water" or "salt-water" from their subjugator, i.e., the dis-
tance from the Third World to Europe, could qualify for decolonization,
or the reassertion of self-determination. 49 All other peoples subjugated
by surrounding states, and this includes most of the world's indigenous
and tribal peoples, would have their grievances individually addressed
via the fast-developing body of human rights law or, collectively, via the
wardship concept of self-government, self-rule, or autonomy, where
they were available.
The debate on self-determination for indigenous peoples and other
ethnic groups that neither aspire to statehood nor fit the classic "blue-
water" model thus flounders on four obstacles: the Westphalian-
derived theory that the nation-state is the perfected form of political
organization towards which all political energy necessarily aspires; the
League of Nations practice of treating peoples as wards of surrounding
states or of the international community; the assumption that collective
grievances are reducible to individual ones; and, finally, the conceit that,
to paraphrase Orwell, some families of subjugation (blue-water) are
more equal than others.
III. Existing Institutions
In addition to the conceptual rigidities discussed above, institutional
rigidities exist as well. The U.N. today does not provide for ethnic
48. Declaration, supra note 17.
49. For the debate see VAN LANGEHOVE, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONS: THE BELGIAN THESIS 83-84 (1954), cited in Patrick Thornberry,
Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 867, 874 (1989).
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groups not constituted as states to participate on a regular basis in U.N.
deliberations, let alone U.N. lawmaking. The reason for this cannot be
that there is an absolute theoretical bar against non-state participation
since other non-state parties have been given votes and international
legal personality in the U.N. system. I think, for example, of the
employer and union representatives who vote at the ILO, and of present
or former subjects of international law such as the U.N. and other inter-
national agencies, the Vatican, the former internationalized territories of
Danzig, Trieste, and Memel, and of the various NGOs that have
achieved active U.N. observer status for one purpose or another.50
When indigenous representatives first attended sessions of the ILO
and the Working Group, they "borrowed" the identity and voice of
these non-state, non-ethnic groups. A Native American would thus sit
and speak as a delegate of the International Commission of Jurists or
other NGO,5 ' and a Maori would relay his people's concerns in his role
as a New Zealand trade unionist.5 2 To its credit, the Working Group
soon did away with the need for this formalistic contrivance and now
invites all concerned parties to speak in their true representative capac-
ity. But the Working Group remains the exceptional U.N. forum in this
regard; moreover, it exists only by grace of the Economic and Social
Council, which could terminate its work at any time. Ethnic group par-
ticipation in the U.N.'s work thus remains uninstitutionalized and
problematic.
Invitations to participate in the work of the United Nations depend
perhaps less on a party's statist or non-statist position than on the
nature of the discourse the party is expected to present. Today, the
U.N. formally privileges three kinds of discourse: the politically hege-
monic, the politically democratic, and the "apolitically" technical. The
first takes place in the Security Council (which could as well be renamed
the Hegemony Council), the second in the General Assembly, and the
third in the several U.N. specialized agencies, ad hoc committees, and
working groups. These discourses share one thing in common: being
political, or utilitarian, or both, they focus on the narrow historical
moment.
A fourth type of discourse, which I call visionary, and which Cornel
West might call prophetic pragmatic, has insinuated itself at the U.N.,
but remains marginal. 53 It is a discourse that, to date, NGOs generally
employ. It tends to juxtapose "what is" with "what should be," the gain
of humans against the loss of nature, the power of states against the
needs of peoples, historical expediency against cultural memory and
vision. While I personally prefer the second member of each of these
pairs, I am not privileging either; anthropologists know that it is the dia-
lectic between the members of the pairs, between history and culture, so
50. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 58-70 (1990).
51. See Coulter, supra note 12, at 31-34.
52. Personal observation, 1989 meeting of the ILO; see supra note 10.
53. See CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY (1989).
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to speak, that serves as the key to creative human adaptation and sur-
vival. 54 Lawyers need also to recognize this and, in the U.N.'s case,
explicitly provide for the dialectic. I will now summarize where I think
the dialectic has already insinuated itself, and where it can be taken.
IV. Insinuated Concepts
The concepts of sovereignty, statehood, peoples and self-determination
retain ambiguities that may be developed to move us from one historical
moment to the next. The right of self-determination formulated imme-
diately after World War II to undo "blue-water" colonization has, in the
70s and 80s, been extended to support peoples' liberation from racist
and alien domination by adjacent populations, as in the cases of South
Africa and the West Bank.5 5 The Western Sahara case, decided by the
International Court of Justice (IC.J.) in 1975, opens up even greater
space. In a display of admirable anthropological sensitivity to the spe-
cific cultural features of North African nomadic societies, the I.CJ. held
that an ethnic people-defined by their sense of collective identity,
mode of political self-regulation, and predictable territory of economic
activity-could, absent traditional indices of formal government, stable
population, and demarcated territory, still claim sovereignty and assert
self-determination. 56
Then too, notwithstanding the official doctrine that the right of
secession ended upon the liberation of all "blue-water" colonies, the
earlier break-up of Pakistan, and now of the Soviet Union and Yugosla-
via, unrolled, or is unrolling, in an atmosphere of great international
anxiety but not prohibition. Indeed, if now Quebec, whose ethnic
"depth" as Quebecois (as opposed to French) is chronologically shal-
lower than that of any other cultural group presently claiming self-deter-
mination, also receives a hushed response from both Canada and the
interstate system to its secession threat, what then remains of the prohi-
bition against secession other than the selective and arbitrary exercise of
raw power?5 7 Indigenous representatives from Canada attending last
summer's Working Group session in Geneva passionately argued that a
54. For an account of the interaction of culture and history in the context of the
encounter between Hawaii and the West, see MARSHALL SAHLINS, HISTORICAL META-
PHORS AND MYTHICAL REALITIES (1981).
55. Works that have dealt comprehensively with the evolving concept of self-
determination include: W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1977); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1982); A. RICO
SUREDA, THE EvOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF UNITED
NATIONS PRACTICE (1973); U. 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1972).
56. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 3).
57. See Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec, Submission: Status and Rights of
the James Bay Crees in the Context of Quebec's Secession from Canada, (Feb. 1992)
(on file with author). The Grand Council is a corporation of the James Bay Cree
Nation (Eeyouch) and a nongovernmental organization in consultative status
(roster).
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self-respecting international law cannot apply as lofty a principle as self-
determination in a racially discriminatory manner: "yes" for whites in
Quebec, "no" for indigenous peoples throughout Canada.58
Perhaps this impassioned plea, combined with the ongoing dissolu-
tion of states in nearby Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
prompted the Working Group at its 1991 session to include for the first
time a provision, albeit ambiguous, recognizing a right of self-determi-
nation for indigenous peoples in its draft Declaration:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination in accordance
with international law. By virtue of this right, they freely determine their
relationship with the States in which they live in a spirit of co-existence
with other citizens and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity.
59
V. Insinuated Practices
If the issues of self-determination and secession are again open to
debate and extension, what of the institutions that could support the
debate and extension? Here, too, a number of useful practices are insin-
uating themselves.
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations is doing on a small
scale for indigenous and tribal peoples what the General Assembly once
did for the Third World: which is to provide a forum for the world's
powerless to voice their vision of identity and destiny in a setting of for-
mal equality with others materially far more powerful than they. In the
U.N.'s early years, many Third World representatives appearing in the
General Assembly had little in the way of political plans, or even state
structure, to present or represent. Western commentators frequently
criticized their lack of positivist legal acumen and derided their aspira-
tional speeches. 60 But there was no backtracking: the U.N. had commit-
ted itself to the principle of political democracy in the General
Assembly. Today, that principle permits a state such as Kiribati, with
fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, to cast a vote of equal weight with
China, a country of more than one billion. Incongruous as this result
may seem, it reproduces in form, if no longer in spirit, the original pur-
pose of the General Assembly, which was to be a one-vision-one-vote
chamber, so to speak. I say form and not spirit because those early Gen-
eral Assembly visions as well as the generation that dreamt them have by
now departed, exiting international history to enter international cul-
ture. The General Assembly's work currently rests with state technicians
58. See Statement of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 20, at 4-6.
59. See DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 13, at 31.
60. Two works that note, and counter, the critical Western reaction to the partici-
pation of Third World, and particularly African, countries in the United Nations in
the early days are: YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF
AFRICA (1983); NASILA S. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: A
STUDY OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN STATES TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAw OF THE SEA 7-13 (1980).
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who appear content to confirm the Security Council's politics, which
from the beginning were designed to be the politics of hegemony.
Outside, around, and beyond these two primary U.N. institutions
are the untidy, relatively unsupervised, and often under-budgeted
appendages of the U.N. where the inspired, the concerned, the
wretched, or simply the unseated of the earth now congregate to relate
their visions. At these margins, marginal people, whose role it is to tell
us where international society's blockages are, and where breakthroughs
might be, continue to gather as they once did at the General Assembly.
The Working Group is a classic example of such a margin, where the
interstate system interfaces with the network of indigenous peoples, and
interested NGOs.
The interface occurs across several permeable surfaces. To begin
with, Working Group members are official agents of the United Nations,
and thus of its Member States. This means that they remain apprised of
states' general perspectives on the tasks they have been assigned, includ-
ing the task of drafting a Declaration of Indigenous Rights. On the
other hand, because Working Group members are designated
"independent experts" under contract, the U.N. must accord their pro-
fessional freedom and competence a certain measure of respect. Fur-
thermore, because members work for the entire U.N., and not for
particular states, they remain relatively invulnerable to specific political
pressure. The Working Group, in other words, is a creation of states,
but not its creature.
In addition to states, the Working Group deals with NGOs and
organizations of indigenous peoples. NGO representatives, like Work-
ing Group members, frequently issue from professional ranks. As such,
the two groups share traditions of knowledge, of activities, and of know-
ing. NGOs supporting indigenous proposals perform a dual function
vis-a-vis Working Group members. As independent agents, NGOs both
entice the semi-independent Working Group members to tread new ter-
ritory and professionally validate that treading in the eyes of states when
it occurs.
The relationship between U.N. experts and indigenous peoples is a
novel one that has evolved through mutual criticism, accommodation,
and perhaps also appreciation. Culturally, socially, and professionally,
Working Group members generally have far more in common with rep-
resentatives of states and NGOS than they do with indigenous spokes-
persons. For example, not a single indigenous lawyer, and certainly
there are many that the U.N. could have chosen, sits on the Working
Group. Nevertheless, whether by chance, by the good-will of the
remarkable chair of the Working Group, Professor Erica Daes of Greece,
or by the insistence of indigenous representatives, the dialogue between
indigenous representatives and members of the Working Group in
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Geneva has been surprisingly productive.6 1
Discussions in the Working Group lack the formality and tokenism
that marked the ILO deliberations on ILO Convention 169 Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, where indige-
nous representatives spoke only at the whim of the chair of the session,
and not by design or right.6 2 The Working Group, by contrast, actively
promotes and eases, financially and otherwise, maximal access to its
forum for indigenous peoples. Its sessions permit and encourage a
supervised exchange of information between states, indigenous peoples,
NGOs, and even individuals who speak simply because they ask to.
Indigenous peoples in Geneva speak in their own voice, and states are
obliged to respond to them as fellow negotiators, not wards. Year after
year, the Working Group redrafts its Declaration in response to posi-
tions and counter-positions expressed at these sessions. Overall, the
successive drafts have moved from the minimalist position of states, to
the visionary one of indigenous peoples.63
Conclusions
In conclusion, I offer two concrete proposals, and a general justification,
for making room for peoples at the United Nations. My minimalist pro-
posal is that the U.N. make available, on a regular basis, and in the spirit
of the Working Group, fora for indigenous peoples and other ethnic
groups to question state decisions and arrangements that affect them.
The time, place, and structure of such fora should be tailored to the
particular needs that call them into existence. Beyond that, they should
primarily provide a "level" field in which communities of peoples, under
the observation of the U.N., may begin the process of negotiating and
renegotiating their relationships with states.
My more ambitious proposal is that the U.N. formally acknowledge
the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples so that they may
become recognized subjects of international law competent to represent
their interests in the international arena. I propose that this right be
extended to indigenous peoples regardless of whether a particular peo-
ple professes to exercise it to remain attached to its present state, to
separate from it, or to form a compact of free association with it or
another state. Indigenous peoples, more than other ethnic groups, rely
on their connection to the territory of their ancestors to reproduce their
place-specific cultures. As such they, more than other groups, require
the protection of territory that the right to self-determination confers
but that mere human rights, for example, would not. At the same time,
the U.N. should set out criteria for, and be prepared to supervise, the
fair and orderly negotiation of the exercise of these choices. The latter
61. For a highly positive appraisal of the work of the Working Group, see Wil-
liams, supra note 16.
62. See supra note 10.
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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should not be irreversible, but can be constrained by reasonable notice
and mutual compensation provisions.
As for justification, I offer the value of multiple inheritance. Anthropo-
logically speaking, we all have but one task as a species: the creation of
our survival with the materials inherited. The biological material we
have inherited is the literally ambivalent double helix, and the creation is
the manner in which its genes recombine and mutate through the gener-
ations. Biological determinism in this respect is a misnomer. It is rather
culture, that other means of human survival, which has become omi-
nously deterministic in the late twentieth century. 64 The double helixes
of the sacred and the secular collapsed at Westphalia, of culture and
polity in the French Revolution, of the Security Council and the General
Assembly during the Gulf War if not before. The demands of indige-
nous peoples for voice and self-determination deeply trouble the
unidimensionally statist international society we have become precisely
because they seek to reinstate ambivalence, recombination, and muta-
tion. Yet that reinstatement could be vital to the reproduction of inter-
national society which, like any other, relies on sources of difference for
adaptation and survival.
At the U.N., the reinstatement could assume the form of a double
helix consisting of the pragmatic strand of the system of states, and the
prophetic strand of the network of peoples, engaged in dynamic genetic
conversation, so to speak. 65 These strands are by no means equal in
power. Neither are they, nor should they be, coeval in function like two
sets of chromosomes. The analogy ends at some point. What remains is
that the perplexity as well as the safety in social life, whether domestic or
international, lodge together in the space called indeterminacy. Not an
"everything goes and nothing matters" indeterminacy, but one where
existing hierarchies, generosities, promises, and abuses can be continu-
ally questioned, reviewed and restructured in the light of both present
exigencies, past dreams, and future visions. 66 States, I think, are gener-
ally structured to function best in the realm of expediency, but cultural
communities remain the better guardians of the past and of the future.
The United Nations-a pleasantly ambiguous term that covers both peo-
ples and states-needs to bring them together in their separate but
intertwining identities.
64. For overviews of the disastrous impact of the globalization of industrial econ-
omy and culture on indigenous and tribal peoples, seeJOHN H. BODLEY, VIcTIMS OF
PROGRESS (1990); BURGER, supra note 24; and BURGER, supra note 5.
65. I am by no means advancing a case for sociobiology. For a case against it, see
MARSHALL SAHLINS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY (1976).
66. An impressive argument for the value of social "incompleteness," and contin-
ual engagement of ethnic perspectives in society, is presented by Adeno Addis, Indi-
vidualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1219 (1991).
